ABSTRACT This paper describes a differential electromagnetic analysis attack performed on a hardware implementation of an elliptic curve cryptosystem. We describe the use of the distance of mean test. The number of measurements needed to get a clear idea of the right guess of the key-bit is taken as indication of the success of the attack. We can find the right key-bit by using only 2000 measurements. Also we give a electromagnetic model for the FPGA we use in our experiments. The amplitude, the direction and the position of the current on the FPGA's lines with respect to the position of the antenna have an influence on the measured electromagnetic radiation in the FPGA's surrounding area.
INTRODUCTION
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) was proposed independently by Miller [1] and Koblitz [2] in the 80's. Since then a considerable amount of research has been performed on secure and efficient ECC implementations. The benefits of ECC, when compared with classical cryptosystems such as RSA [3] , include: higher speed, lower power consumption and smaller certificates, which are especially useful for wireless applications.
There is a vast literature on differential electromagnetic radiation analysis (DEMA). This paper describes a DEMA attack performed on an FPGA implementation of an elliptic curve cryptosystem over GF(p) [4, 5] . The attacks in previous papers were performed on software implementations or were only simulations of attacks. With the start of differential power analysis in [6] , followed by the differential electromagnetic analysis [7, 8] , several metrics were used to decide for the correct hypothesis. We use the distance of mean test as our metric. The number of measurements for the key guess to stabilize is representative for the quality of the metric and the success of the DEMA attack. We can find the right key bit by using only 2000 measurements.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 the theoretical background of elliptic curves, the electromagnetic radiation attacks and the distance of mean test are discussed.
Section 3 gives an overview of the previous work in this area. This section is followed by a description of the measurement setup (Section 4) and by the electromagnetic model of the FPGA (Section 5). The DEMA attack is given in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper. 2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 2.1 Elliptic curves over GF(p) An elliptic curve £ is expressed in terms of the Weierstrass equation: y2 = t3 + ax + b, where a, b E GF(p) with 4a3 + 27b2 i 0 (mod p). The point at infinity 0 plays a role analogous to that of the number 0 in ordinary addition. The points on an elliptic curve together with the operation of addition form an Abelian group. The point multiplication in elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) can be calculated by with the always double-and-add algorithm as shown in Algorithm 1. For details see [1, 2, 9] . Algorithm 1 Elliptic curve point multiplication (ECPM) Input:. C point P -(x y), integer k, k -(1,k2, * ko)2 OUtpUt. Q -[k]P (x', y') Q P-, for i from I -2 downto 0 Q, <-2Q, Q2 <-Q + P, if k 0 then Q Qi else Q -Q2 2.2 Electromagnetic Analysis Attacks
The current consumption of CMOS circuits is data-dependent. However, for the attacker, the relevant question is to know whether this data-dependent behavior is observable.
The current that flows during the switching of the CMOS gates, causes a variation of the electromagnetic field surrounding the chip that can be monitored by inductive probes which are particularly sensitive to the related impulse. The electromotive force across the sensor (Lentz' law) relates to the variation of magnetic flux as follows [10] [11] . The first published papers are work of Quisquater and Samyde [8] and the Gemplus team [7] . Quisquater and Samyde showed that it is possible to measure the electromagnetic radiation from a smart card. Quisquater also introduced the terms Simple EMA (SEMA) and Differential EMA (DEMA). The work of Gemplus deals with experiments on three algorithms: DES, RSA and COMP128.
According to Agrawal et [12, 13] . More precisely, EM leakage consists of multiple channels. Therefore, compromising information can be available even for DPA resistant devices which can be detached from the measurement equipment. Besides carefully exploring all available EM emanations an attacker can also focus on a combination of two or more side-channels. Agrawal et al. defined these so-called multichannel attacks in which the side-channels are not necessarily of a different kind [14] .
Mangard also showed that near-field EM attacks can be conducted even with a simple hand-made coil in [15] . Besides that he showed that measuring the far-field emissions of a smart card connected to a power supply unit also suffices to determine the secret key used in the smart card. Carlier et al. showed that EM side channels from an FPGA implementation of AES can be effectively used by an attacker to retrieve some secret information in [16] . De Mulder et al. presented a SEMA and a DEMA attack on an FPGA implementation of an elliptic curve processor in [17] . 4 
MEASUREMENT SETUP
The measurement setup consists of the FPGA board with a Xilinx Virtex 800 FPGA presented in [18] , an Tektronix TDS714L oscilloscope, a handmade loop antenna, a function generator and a power supply. The total power consumption and the electromagnetic radiation of the FPGA were measured simultaneously while it executes an elliptic curve point multiplication with the key and a point on the curve.
ELECTROMAGNETIC MODEL OF THE FPGA
The following model gives an explanation of why we use a loop antenna and mentions some properties of the measured field which could be taken into account in the prediction phase of an attack. The current in an FPGA flows from the power source to the ground, in this way a loop is formed. At first approximation, the currents in an FPGA form small loops, that is why these currents could be modeled with a magnetic dipole as elementary building block. If the current loop is situated in the xy-plane and if we suppose that the medium where the loop is situated can be thought as free of loss; this suggests that c7 0, then the electrical and magnetic field is defined by the following equations: Hr = IA kg coS()e-jkgrr-2(1 + (jkgr)-,), Ho = IA (-kg) sin(O)e-kgrr-1(1 + (jkgr)-1 + (jkgr)-2), E¢, =IAkg2Zsin(O)eigrr-l(1 + (jkgrI1), where Zc is the characteristic impedance of the medium. In air this equals 120wr and kg the wave number, A is the surface of the loop, I is the current through the loop and r is the distance from the center of the loop until the point where the field is calculated. Because we are measuring in the near field, only the near-field terms are important, this leaves: Hr =2wr cos(O)e ik r3 (1) H0 =-j 4w sin(O)e-ik9rr3 (2) From this we can observe that in the near field, with the assumption of the magnetic dipole as elementary building block, only the magnetic field is important. To fully profit from this knowledge an inductive antenna should be used. We used this kind of antenna to measure the magnetic near field of the FPGA, more specific we used a circular loop antenna. They are more used to receive than to transmit, especially when the efficiency of the antenna is not more important than the signal-to-noise-ratio [19] .
Our FPGA is divided into several banks each of which has one or more power pins and ground pins. So, if we use first order modeling we could imagine current flowing from the power pins in 1 bank, trough the bank, to the ground pins in the same bank. Figure 2 shows the explanation graphically and Fig. 3 shows the first order model of the current flow in the FPGA. In this section, we conduct a DEMA attack on a FPGA implementation of an elliptic curve processor over GF(p) [4, 5] . The electromagnetic radiation trace of one EC point multiplication is shown in Fig. 4.(a) .
The target for our DEMA attack is the second most significant bit (MSB) of the key, kl12, in Algorithm 1. There are two temporary point registers in the design, Qi and Q2.
These temporary points and the output point Q are updated in the following order: Q = P, Q1 = 2P, Q2= 3P, Q 2P ifkl12
The first step of the DEMA attack is to find the point to measure. The electromagnetic radiation trace of an EC point multiplication is shown in Fig. 4.(a) . Our choice for the measurement point is the fifth spike shown on Fig. 4.(a) . This spike corresponds to the second update of Qi after the second EC point doubling.
We have produced a electromagnetic radiation file. For this purpose, we have chosen N random points on the EC and one fixed, but random key, k. The FPGA executes N point multiplications such that Q0 = [k]P for i = 1,2, ,N. We have measured the electromagnetic radiation of the FPGA during 2400 clock cycles around the second update of Qi. The clock frequency applied to the chip was around $300 kHz and the sampling frequency of the oscilloscope was 250 MHz. With these measurements, we have produced M1, in which Ml(i) is the ith measurement. The electromagnetic radiation trace of one of these measurements is shown in Fig. 4.(b) .
We have applied a pre-processing technique to reduce the amount of measurement data We have implemented the EC point multiplication with Algorithm 1 in the C programming language. During the execution of the EC point multiplications, the C program computes the number of bits that change from 0 to 1 in some registers at the step corresponding to the fifth spike shown in Fig. 4.(b) . The number of transitions is used as the electromagnetic radiation prediction.
We have produced two electromagnetic radiation prediction matrices, MAi3 and Ml4, for the kl2=0 and k1_2 =1 guesses, respectively. Ml3 and Ml4 have one column for the fifth spike and N rows for the N EC points. We use the prediction matrices Al3 (for k1_2 -0 guess) and Al4 (for k1_2 =1 guess) in order to split the measurements in Al2 into sets. For each guess, we divide the N measurements into two sets. First we calculate the mean value of the prediction matrix Al3, £E(Al3). Measurement by measurement, we check if the predicted value is lower than the average value. If so, we put the measurement in set Si,i, otherwise in set S1,2. Then we calculate the mean value for each of the two sets and calculate the bias signal as T1 =E(S1,2) -E(Si,i). We do the same for the prediction matrix Al4, the sets are now called S2,i and S2,2 and the bias signal is T2. The current consumption bias signals for k1_2 =0 and k1_2 =1 guesses are shown in Fig. 5 . The figure shows a high peak on the expected spot on the trace for the k1_2 =1 guess. Hence the decision for the right key-bit is equal to 1. Figure 6 shows the change in the amplitude of all the clock cycles of the current consumption bias signals for the k1_2 =1 guess. The number of measurements on these traces are the number of measurements in the sets S2,i, S2,2 described above. The number of measurements in these sets are nearly the same. Hence we should multiply the number of measurements seen in Fig. 6 by two in order to find the needed number of measurements.
As it is shown in Fig. 6 2000 measurements are needed to distinguish the right clock cycle from the wrong ones.
CONCLUSIONS
We have implemented a differential electromagnetic analysis attack on an FPGA implementation of elliptic curve cryptosystems over GF(p). We use distance of mean test as the metric for the differential analysis. We conclude that it is possible to find the right key bit with 2000 measurements. The electromagnetic antenna model in this paper gives a 
